Animal' as that which is deprived of the Logos, the right and power to respond, is at the root of the misery inflicted on other animal species by humans, or on other humans unfortunate enough to have themselves been marked out as 'Animal'. The gorillas in the House of Light represent the culmination of this Enlightenment reduction of 'the Animal': the subject is held in a fearsome geometry, a lyrical celebration of human reason. But this extremity is also a symptom of societal unease -an anthropocentric reinstitution of the superiority of the human over 'the Animal' that testifies to the panic generated by 'humanity's second trauma': evolution -the knowledge that mankind is intimately involved in everything that it had for so long tried to disavow as other, as Animal.
But what did Descartes actually say, and in what way does his theoretical formulation of the human -animal binary differ from the earlier idea stretching right back to Aristotle that the human being is an animal distinguished from the rest by its capacity for rational thought: the rational animal? As Derrida points out, Descartes is a man in a hurry, compelled to eliminate everything that is not certain and indubitable. Here is the passage in the Meditations in which Descartes called time on the earlier definition:
What, then, did I formerly think I was? I thought I was a man. But what is a man? Shall I say rational animal? No indeed: for it would be necessary next to inquire what is meant by animal, and what by rational, and, in this way, from one single question, we would fall unwittingly into an infinite number of others, more difficult and awkward than the first, and I would not wish to waste the little time and leisure remaining to me by using it to unravel subtleties of this kind. 5 To arrive at what 'I am' it is necessary to begin by dismissing the concept of the rational animal. This frees Descartes to reach a new formulation in Discourse on Method -'I think therefore I am'. 6 On first impression, this might seem to be merely reasserting the idea that humanity's defining characteristic is reason: I think -I have the capacity for rational thought. But what must follow? I am a human being? No. I think therefore I AM. Something truly radical has taken place here in relation to that earlier tradition, a moment of Animal That Therefore I Am (More To Follow) ', trans. David Wills, Critical Inquiry, 28/2 (Winter 2002) pp. 369 -418) . 5 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Other Writings, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (London 1968) pp. 103 -4. 6 Ibid., p. 53.
rupture that has had profound implications for humanity's relationship to 'the Animal'. In a startling move the capacity for rational thought has been equated with Being itself, with the very Name of God. Previous philosophers had insisted that animals lacked reason, though Aristotle, for instance, clearly believed that humans and animals shared much else. Certain animals possessed qualities nearly akin to those common to humankind in greater or less measure: 'For just as we pointed out resemblances in the physical organs, so in a number of animals we observe gentleness and fierceness, mildness or cross-temper, courage or timidity, fear or confidence, high spirits or low cunning, and with regard to intelligence, something akin to sagacity.' 7 In contrast, the new means for defining the essence of what it is to be human cut us off from animals in the world, and from everything that is animal in our own selves. 'But I, who am certain that I am, do not yet know clearly enough what I am; so that henceforth I must take great care not imprudently to take some other object for myself, and thus avoid going astray in this knowledge which I maintain to be more certain and evident than all I have had hitherto.' 8 To this end Descartes abstracted from the 'I am' his own living body, which is presented objectively as a machine or a corpse: 'I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms, and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in a corpse and which I designated by the name of body.' 9 In short, he is a 'thing that thinks '. 10 And anything lacking the capacity for rational thought is nothing more than a machine, is empty of the living Name of God. The animal is therefore, in a sense, unreal: no longer capable of a meaningful response -of saying 'I am'. In order to illustrate this point, Descartes presents us with a famous allegory that curiously anticipates the science fiction of Philip K. Dick. Imagine a future in which no human has ever seen an animal. Imagine human beings have created a machine that precisely simulates the appearance, movement, and sound of an irrational animal.
11 According to Descartes, one could not distinguish between the real and the simulated animal, because there would be no fundamental difference. But no one could make such a mistake if confronted with a clockwork human, and this is because human beings are capable of responding in an intelligent fashion to any questions put to them. Ibid, This shows not only that animals have less reason than humans, but that they have none at all; for we see that very little of it is required in order to be able to speak; and since one notices inequality among animals of the same species as well as among people, and that some are easier to train than others, it is unbelievable that the most perfect monkey or parrot of its species should not equal in this the most stupid human, or at least a child with a disturbed brain, unless their souls were of an altogether different nature from our own.
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The discovery of the gorilla in the nineteenth century posed a challenge to this classic thought-experiment, presenting new possibilities that were to prove profoundly unsettling to the hard-and-fast categories of humanist thought. The earliest specimens (a skull and other bones) were obtained by the American physician and missionary Thomas Staughton Savage in Liberia, and presented to the scientific community as Troglodytes Gorilla in Proceedings of the Boston Society of Natural History in 1847. 13 The first part of the name simply means cave-dweller, but the second part is derived from a mysterious word that occurs in the Periplus of Hanno the Navigator -a Greek translation of a Punic account of a voyage along the coast of West Africa in the fifth century BCE.
14 After cataloguing the fauna and prominent landmarks encountered (a mountain of the gods, a river of fire pouring into the sea), Hanno speaks of a skirmish between the Carthagenians and a tribe of hairy folk:
By flame for three days to South Horn, the bayou, the island of folk hairy and savage whom our Lixtae said were Gorillas. We cd. not take any man, but three of their women. Their men clomb up the crags, Rained stone, but we took three women who bit, scratched, wd. not follow their takers. Killed, flayed, brought back their pelts into Carthage. Went no further that voyage, as were at end of provisions. Neither Greek nor Punic, the word gorilla might be related to gorku, the Fulani word for man, the diminutive form of which is gorel.
16 But it is impossible to be sure if the gorilla should be identified as a forgotten breed of hominid or with the species later designated as such. In any event, this name proved an inspired choice; with its echo of a remote, mythical past, gorilla fired the imagination, initiating a rush for specimens on the part of museums across the world.
The first stuffed gorillas were displayed in Paris in 1852. The explorer Paul du Chaillu became the first Western man to see a living gorilla on his expedition of 1856 -9, and brought the first dead specimen to England in 1861.
17 But in spite of the mounting interest provoked by these scientific discoveries, which only intensified following publication of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in 1859, no systematic field study took place before the second quarter of the twentieth century, when the American Museum of Natural History sent Carl Akeley to secure specimens for the collection. 18 For over seventy years the term gorilla would mark, no less than it had in the time of Hanno, the point at which knowledge failed, the edge of uncharted territory -a space for speculation and for doubt.
The first, and perhaps most unsettling, of the new monsters to emerge from this vanishing point, is the sculpture Gorilla Dragging Away a Dead Negress (1859) by Emmanuel Fremiert. In this colossal image there is none of the twisted eroticism that hindsight might lead us to expect in this the first representation of that now familiar trope of the gorilla and the girl. Crushed tight by a huge stubby hand, the woman's face and body are pressed into the flabby bulk of a female gorilla; a big hoop swings from the ear beneath an elaborate head dress; the robes are heavy, funereal; the arm let swing is not that of some sylph from the Salon but muscular; the fingers a taut claw; no poetry, no glamour; a real corpse. The gorilla's face is a blank, fixed snarl, but the eyes are sad. Surging forward, the gorilla is an unstoppable force bearing the away the dead. But it is impossible to read reasons or circumstances into this sombre tableau. The piece possesses a mystery that is profoundly troubling; something terrible 16 This interesting idea is put forward in the papers of the late Livio Catullo Stecchini, collected at www.metrum.org.
17 Paul du Chaillu, Explorations and Adventures in equatorial Africa: with accounts of the manners and customs of the people, and of the chase of the gorilla, the crocodile, leopard, elephant, hippopotamus, and other animals (London 1861). 18 An expedition later recounted by mystery writer Mary Bradley in On the Gorilla Trail (New York 1922).
has taken place, something of a mythical order, not spelt out. Exhibited in the same year that saw the publication of the Origin of Species, it is little wonder that the Paris Salon refused to exhibit the piece, only consenting to do so on condition that the gorilla was screened by a curtain, nor that it hastened to have the sculpture destroyed after the exhibition. The gorilla entered the art of the West freighted with humanity's second trauma, hauling off the shell of what was once thought to be the image of God.
Fremiet's next treatment of the motif greatly refined the gorilla's symbolic potential. His Gorilla Carrying Off a Woman of 1887 won the Paris Salon Medal of Honour, and the Republic approved a bronze reproduction edition that proved highly popular.
19 This is rather a curious reversal, since this image is more sensational than the first. Once again a gorilla is carrying away a woman, tucked tight under its biceps -but the woman is beating and pushing the monster, her breasts crushed big against the ape, her thighs behind soft and full, embodying a sensuality in shocking juxtaposition with that immense knot of bone and muscle and hair. There is no uncertainty, no ambiguity as to intent: an alpha male gorilla in heat, hefting a sharp-edged rock, screaming through a mouthful of fangs. But in some respects this image is safer, though more explicit, rather more conventional, than the group of 1859. The original was shocking because Fremiet had chosen to adopt a style that drew upon his training as an illustrator at the Parisian Museum of Natural History: stiffly respectable, rigorously researched, and anatomically correct, best remembered for the Terrible Lizards that roam through Crystal Palace Park -that stocky mid-Victorian naturalism which had become inextricably identified with scientific veracity. In contrast, the later Gorilla is in a style more in keeping with the aesthetic of the Paris Salon. The woman is now Caucasian, the scene is of no particular time or place but is set in some mythical past. The sculpture could be taken as a modern recapitulation of the Centauromachy -an allegory in classical art, expressing humanity's struggle to overcome the irrational or animal. The motif has been reconfigured as a conflict, the outcome of which is far from being as clear-cut as might initially appear.
Fremiet's iconic revision of the gorilla and the girl is recapitulated with remarkably little elaboration in the scores of gorilla-related horror movies 19 For a discussion of the evolution of this motif in that were produced in the early twentieth century. One recent survey indicates that one hundred films with gorillas were made between 1908 and 1948, and of these the vast majority were horror films. 20 Most of the gorillas in the genre were played by men in gorilla costumes -a dedicated band of professional ape-impersonators, often taking their passion for realism to alarming lengths. If no one has heard of Charlie Gemora, the Master of the Art, it is in part because this remarkable actor would insist on having his name removed from the credits in order to maintain the realism of the production. The maker of his own gorilla suit, and the sculptor of the gigantic hand that reaches into a hotel room to snatch Fay Wray in King Kong (1933), Charlie Gemora was the leading figure in a genre that testifies to the tremendous unease that surrounded these recently discovered creatures in the public mind, rehearsing the psychopathologies the collapsing Cartesian paradigm had generated beneath the veneer of twentieth-century culture, often with surprising sensitivity and sophistication.
The motif of the gorilla and the girl, repeated ad infinitum in these films, owed its popularity to the fact that it successfully channelled as yet vague new fears into a familiar and therefore reassuring template: the conflict between Man and his Inner Animal. This fact is nowhere clearer than in Edward D. Wood Junior's sole contribution to the genre -his brilliantly twisted script for Bride and the Beast (1958) , in which a couple have their wedding night disturbed by the violent bull gorilla that the husband, Dan, keeps locked up in a dungeon (complete with flaming torches) underneath the house. The gorilla is called Spanky, and Dan is not a little disturbed to discover that his new wife ( played by Charlotte Austin), who insists on sleeping in a separate bed to her husband, smoulders with a sexual intensity rarely caught on celluloid whenever in the presence of the gorilla. A jealous Dan shoots Spanky dead, and Charlotte Austin is subjected to hypnotherapy and regressed to a past life, in which she was an albino gorilla. Readers who have seen Tim Burton's wonderful biopic Ed Wood (1994) will have no difficulty in recognising the confession that emerges in the course of the hypnosis as an expression of the director's own unconventional sexual drives: 'Soft like kitten's fur', says Charlotte Austin, recalling her former pelt. 'Felt so good on me.'
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Though rather more candid in this respect than most, the process of projection crystallised in this particular gorilla movie is a characteristic feature of a genre that could have been invented for the sole purpose of 20 See the filmography at www.gorillamen.com. 21 Adrian Weiss (dir.), The Bride and the Beast (Allied Artists Pictures, 1958). illustrating the psychoanalytical interpretation of animal phobia developed earlier in the century by Sigmund Freud. In short, this is the theory that sexual desires deemed abhorrent by the father, together with hatred of the father provoked by that repression, are displaced onto an animal. 'By wildbeasts the dream-work usually symbolises passionate impulses', Freud explains; 'those of the dreamer, and also those of other persons of whom the dreamer is afraid; or thus, by means of a very slight displacement, the persons who experience those passions.' 22 In fact, Freud's thoughts on this topic seem eerily prescient when one remembers that so many gorillas in these movies are treated precisely as totem animals: 'From [the dream] it is not very far to the totemistic representation of the dreaded father by means of vicious animals, dogs, wild horses, etc. One might say that wildbeasts serve to represent the libido, feared by the ego, and combated by repression.'
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'The conflict between Man and his Inner Animal': this is clearly how many engaging with the trope of the gorilla at the time explained the motif to themselves. Consider Aldous Huxley's satirical representation of the American film industry in Ape and Essence (1948). Huxley picks up on the recurring imagery of the ape in films produced in this era, and incorporates this into a meta-fictional film script discovered by an exploratory expedition sent to a Hollywood destroyed by nuclear war. In the following passage the Freudian-Darwinian understanding of the horror of the ape outlined above is presented as self-evident: Surely it's obvious. Doesn't every schoolboy know it? Ends are ape-chosen; only the means are man's . . . Church and State, Greed and Hate: -Two Baboon-Persons in one Supreme Gorilla.
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But there is a problem with this psychoanalytical approach. The animal itself is entirely eliminated from the equation. The specific horror of the ape is neutralised in the moment of its expression. In becoming a sign for 22 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (1913) the 'bestial' -the term which most accurately describes the horror of what you see in these movies -the gorilla has become a symbol of something from which beasts are exempt by definition. As Derrida has observed, 'One cannot speak . . . of the bêtise or bestiality of an animal. It would be an anthropomorphic projection of something that remains the preserve of man.' 25 In presenting the gorilla as a symbol of the Inner Animal, movie-makers and writers were re-enacting the disavowal of something intrinsically human. The gorilla is reduced to an empty sign, interchangeable with any other animal species in a structure of meaning that is the product of that sign-making power thought proper to humans. These motion pictures ultimately reassert the problematic Cartesian formulation of the human subject and the animal object.
But is the gorilla interchangeable with any other species? It is true every creature imaginable has at some point or another been rendered an object of horror by the film industry; there have been birds, there have been sharks, there have even been killer shrews. In any number of gorilla horror movies, from Bela Lugosi's Murders in the Rue Morgue (1932) to Acquanetta's Captive Wild Women (1943) , the horror of the ape can be seen to derive not merely from its role as a symbol, one among many, for the depredations of the subconscious mind, but from the fact that the gorilla was perceived to be the embodiment of the challenge that the great apes posed to the thought-experiment set out in the Discourse on Method. Descartes asserted that the machine or animal would always be recognised as such by us because the animal-machine could not respond, and because an intelligent response could not be simulated. But could the Logos be aped?
In The Descent of Man (1871), Charles Darwin had remarked: 'It is not the mere power of articulation that distinguishes man from other animals, for as everyone knows, parrots can talk; but it is his large power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas.' 26 But having clearly signalled his engagement in this way with Cartesian thought, Darwin then observed that this is an art and therefore achieved through imitation: 'As bearing on the subject of imitation, the strong tendency in our nearest allies, the monkeys, in microcephalous idiots, and in the barbarous races of mankind, to imitate whatever they hear deserves notice.'
27 If those dull, stupid men mentioned by Descartes could be conflated in this way with mere monkeys and said to be entirely capable of the mimicry that 25 permitted language, what might happen when explorers eventually discovered the 'perfect ape'? 28 Could we count on our ability to tell the simulation or aping of a response by this sophisticated animal-machine from the real thing?
One should bear in mind just how little was known concerning gorillas in this period. No one yet knew what these beasts were capable of -and for the vast majority of people in the 1930s and 1940s the gorilla was, of course, a man in a costume called Charlie Gemora! It is possible that the gorilla horror movies of the period played no small part in exacerbating anxieties that sustained them, presenting their uninformed audiences with preternaturally intelligent gorilla-men.
The nature of this anxiety emerges particularly clearly in what must be the original ape-related horror story, and primary prototype for the genre considered above, The Murders in the Rue Morgue (1841) by Edgar Allan Poe. The unsettling effect of the story stems in large part from the fact that the sleuth Dupin refers to the deaths in the Rue Morgue as 'murders' after he has eliminated the possibility that the perpetrator could be human: 'In the manner of thrusting the corpse up the chimney, you will admit that there was something excessively outré -something altogether irreconcilable with our common notions of human action, even when we suppose the actors the most depraved of men.' 29 The narrator confesses to feeling 'a creeping of the flesh' on hearing Dupin's summary of the case; and one can understand why, when one appreciates that a murder that represents a 'horror absolutely alien from humanity' necessarily involves a paradox. 30 For as Will Smith observes in I, Robot (2004) , only a human can be guilty of homicide -a restatement of the familiar Cartesian conflation of the human being with the capacity for rational judgement. It is significant that when the narrator speculates that '[a] madman . . . has done this deed -some raving maniac, escaped from a neighbouring Maison de Santé', Dupin concedes that the 'idea is not irrelevant'.
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Presumably the idea is not irrelevant because a madman would not have been tried for a murder in any court. In solving the 'murders' in the Rue Morgue, Dupin discovers that no murder took place -and so no one is charged for this offence at the end. Because the perpetrator is an ape. Not a gorilla -the mystery was published six years before the scientific discovery of that species -but a 'large fulvous Ourang-Outang of the 28 East Indian Islands'. 32 The violent deaths were not murder, but the result of the mechanical imitation believed to be proper to an ape -aping a man shaving -followed by violent reaction to a sudden fright. Poe has presented the reader with the perfect simulation of a crime by an animal lacking the capacity for rational thought. The most intelligent men on the Parisian police force have been shown to have failed that test upon which Descartes had grounded his case for setting human beings apart from animal-machines: they have been shown to be incapable of distinguishing the illusion of the Logos from the real thing. Nor, one should point out, is the effect of Dupin's intervention exactly to restore these imperilled boundaries. In his famous preface, Poe explains that the purpose of the narrative is to provide a commentary on his proposition there is a hitherto unrecognised distinction between ingenuity and analysis. 'The consecutive or combining power, by which ingenuity is usually manifested, and to which the phrenologists (I believe erroneously) have assigned a separate organ, supposing it a primitive faculty, has been so frequently seen in those whose intellect bordered otherwise upon idiocy, as to have attracted general observations among writers on morals.' 33 Against the ingenuity of a retentive memory and of playing by the book, Poe sets up the analysis that he characterises as the very soul and essence of method: 'it is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the analyst is evinced'. 34 The narrative presents a very clear difference between the acumen of Dupin and the mere cunning of the prefect of police. But it is hard to say how one can distinguish the cunning exhibited by the Parisian police from the cunning exhibited -to rather more effect! -by the orang-utan. In each case, cunning is based on a retentive memory and the capacity for repeating certain procedures in a mechanical, unreflective way. Perhaps the most terrifying element in this landmark horror story is a variation on the familiar Cartesian distinction between response and reaction that puts most of humanity beyond the pale, with little or nothing to distinguish the 'ingenuity' of which they boast from the 'cunning' of the merely animal.
The full implications of this impending ontological crisis are set out in Pierre Boulle's novel La Planète des Singes (1963) . The film adaptation, Planet of the Apes (1968), significantly revised the plot of Boulle's novel in order to present a timely satire on the 'bestiality' of mankind, merely reconfirming the Cartesian human -animal binary in the act of inverting it. The book is very different. Everything horrific in the novel stems from 32 Ibid., p. 437. 33 Ibid., p. f?g. 34 Ibid., p. f?g. the fact that for the most part everyday life is pure 'reaction' rather than 'response' -and can therefore be aped. It is in this traditional belief that it is the capacity for imitation that is characteristic of the ape that the specific anxieties that became attached to the new anthropoid apes, and the unfortunate gorilla in particular, are to be found. In these passages from La Planète des Singes we have, fully realised, the horror of the ape.
What is it that characterizes a civilisation? Is it the exceptional genius? No, it is everyday life. . . Is it possible that creatures devoid of intelligence could have perpetuated it by a simple process of imitation? . . . This should be able to be achieved by monkeys, who are essentially imitators, provided of course they are able to make use of language. . . At the level of administration, the quality of aping seemed even easier to admit. To continue our system, the gorillas would merely have to imitate certain attitudes and deliver a few harangues, all based on the same model.
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* * * Charlie Gemora would have instantly recognised the compositional elements in the Gorilla House at London Zoo. The 'intrinsic human ceremony' enacted by a porch ushering the public into a dark theatre. 36 And that sliding panel -like the false walls that conceal Spanky's dungeon, or that of Bela Lugosi in The Ape-Man (1943), or like the curtains that screen King Kong, or Fremiet's first gorilla sculpture -everything in the approach to the building worked towards a particular theatrical effect. The big reveal of a horror intended to figure the spectator's own primitive drives -suddenly there and held in a spotlight. If the Gorilla House presents certain strong similarities to the cabinet of Dr Caligari, the laboratory of the mad scientist, this is perhaps no coincidence. For there is evidence to suggest that Lubetkin may have been inspired in his design by the same sources. 'There are two possible methods of approach to the problem of zoo design', explained Lubetkin; 'the first, which we may call the "naturalistic" method, is typified in the Hamburg and Paris zoos, where an attempt is made, as far as possible, to reproduce the natural habitat of each animal; the second approach, which, for want of a better word, we may call the "geometric", consists of designing architectural set-tings for the animals in such a way as to present them dramatically to the public, in an atmosphere comparable to that of a circus.' 37 Lubetkin was committed to ensuring that his enclosures drew upon traditional spaces of popular entertainment. His elephant paddock at Whipsnade Zoo emulates a big top, for instance. The famous Penguin Pool at London Zoo resembles a lido. And, perhaps most troubling, his pit for the polar bears at Dudley Zoo can only have been modelled on the Elizabethan bear pit -a vertical tube in which bears were set upon by dogs for the amusement of the public. In the light of this commitment it seems at least highly probable that Lubetkin's first structure for London Zoo was based upon the platform for the popular exhibition of the gorilla referenced by so much cinema of the period. That is to say, the freak show at a circus or fairground.
This was not lost on contemporary critics. An American critic for instance argued that the modernist projects at London Zoo had the 'flavor of a circus or a country carnival' for the 'pure pleasure and amusement of their owner' with the result being that 'the educational or scientific value of an English zoo is nearly zero'. 38 In a recent article surveying the legacy of Bauhaus ideas in the UK, science historian Peder Anker cites this passage, and explains that this interpretation of the project (that is to say, the architect's own understanding of his zoo buildings) can only obscure the very real scientific objectives that the management at London Zoo hoped to achieve through commissioning these new buildings. 'Though they welcomed entertainment that could generate general interest in biology (and money from entrance fees), they were not willing to pursue amusement at the expense of their scientific integrity', insists Anker. 'It was the promotion of public health and not amusement which prompted the Zoo keepers to build modernist architecture.' His subsequent emphasis on the discourse of the 'healthy environment', shared by zoo keepers, newspapers, and architects alike, is entirely correct, and the article as a whole is extremely illuminating. But I would like to suggest that Lubetkin's conception of nature as a circus for human entertainment was not incompatible with the scientific and educational objectives of the London Zoological Society's research anatomist, Solly Zuckerman, who played a major role in securing the commission for Tecton.
For much of his life, Zuckerman saw himself as engaged in an unrelenting struggle against the cardinal error of inferring that 'comparison of animal and human social life will enable us to discover some of the basic instincts and impulses upon which the whole edifice of human society is reared '. 39 It is true that Zuckerman believed the life of primates to be a crude picture of a social level from which our earliest human ancestors emerged: 'But', Zuckerman immediately goes on to say, 'only that.'
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Contrary to Anker's assertion, his landmark thesis on primate behaviour, The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes (1932) , does not present this material as a model for explaining deeper sexual and social instincts in humans. 'Indeed much could be said for divorcing the study of man's behaviour from that of other animals in relation to the subject matter of sociological discussion.' 41 It is explained that 'When the impetus given to biological inquiry by Darwin's exposition of the evolutionary hypothesis made them prominent subjects for discussion, both these aspects of mammalian behaviour were at first considered together, and there accumulated a wealth of literature to fill the Cartesian gulf separating man from the beasts, and proving the continuity of mind and society through the world of living organisms.'
42 Thus Kropotkin's Mutual Aid (1919) examined organised social groups in the animal kingdom to prove that progress is best fostered by the practice of mutual co-operation and support.
43 E. Westermarck's The History of Human Marriage (1921) provided an anecdotal account of the 'family group' of the gorilla in order to establish a natural basis for the human institution of marriage.
44 And Yerkes and Yerkes had taken certain facts about a New World monkey to indicate 'a species of communism' as being 'of the utmost importance to mankind'. 45 Zuckerman casts a caustic eye on that 'somewhat surprising discovery of politico-economic systems at a biological level in which work and production, in the economic sense, can hardly be thought of as existing '. 46 He proceeds to point out that the mating habits of even closely aligned species such as spotted deer and red deer can differ enormously: 'it is even more misleading to attempt to infer the mating habits of the first men from those of the gorilla or any other sub-human primate'. 47 The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes would take a very different approach and signalled this intent on the very first page, which opens by quoting Hoppius, 39 S. Zuckerman, The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes (1932; London 1981) a naturalist of the eighteenth century, who advised posterity that 'it would lead not a little to Philosophy, if one were to spend a day' with apes 'exploring how far human wit exceeds theirs, what distance lies between Brutish and rational discrimination'. 48 The book that follows is very much in keeping with these 'Cartesian principles', providing an epoch-making account of the atrocities that took place on Monkey Hill between 1925 and 1930. 'It is in their demonstration of the ways in which human social behaviour has renounced its biological background that studies of Old World apes and monkeys have greatest significance', Zuckerman later explained, in his article on 'The Biological Background of Human Social Behaviour ' (1937) . 'Such studies do not indicate fundamental limiting factors in primate social expressions, but they show the full extent to which human behaviour has altered in the course of human evolution'.
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The sexual violence inflicted on the living and the dead on Monkey Hill should most certainly not be read, it is implied, in order to gain an insight into what we are as a species -and one suspects that the often gruesome details in Zuckerman's account were intended precisely to forestall any such effort. 'Those who study the social behaviour of apes', he continued in his characteristically dry fashion, 'in the belief that they are significantly helping in the provision of data that will allow of the better ordering of human society would appear to be somewhat mistaken.'
50 If his study of the sexual power-struggles among baboons at London Zoo was intended to serve this end, there is a terrible irony in the fact that Zuckerman's account was so often received in the opposite spirit by his readers. This is registered in the postscript to the belated second edition of The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes (1981) , in which Zuckerman attacked the ongoing misuse of information about the social lives of primates to provide a natural foundation for theories about humankind's political problems: 'The proposition that the aggressive "instincts" we have inherited from our primitive forebears have something to do with the control of overpopulation or possible nuclear war, is no more sophisticated or useful a message than was the view of Sir Arthur Keith, that renowned British physical anthropologist of the early half of our century, that "war is Nature's pruning hook" -a conclusion which he was able to reach without the benefit of the writings of latter-day primatologists.' This is not to say that Zuckerman denied that the ferocious sexual drives displayed on Monkey Hill held some place in the unconscious of the human psyche. In fact, in his article on 'The Biological Background to Human Social Behaviour' he readily identifies with the theory, developed by Freud in Totem and Taboo, that 'The price of our emergence as man would seem to have been the overt renunciation of a dominant primate impulse in the field of sex.' 52 There can be no doubt that Anker is correct to suggest that Zuckerman believed that 'Visitors at the Zoo observing the gorillas would thus also observe and reflect upon their own primitive desires.' 53 But it should be recognised that this belief must have been enormously complicated by that scientist's life-long battle against those who made easy analogical comparisons with the ways of monkeys and apes in order to shore up their own theories on human society. Instead of ignoring the elements in the Gorilla House that echo the circus freak-show on the basis that this format is incompatible with serious scientific objectives, we should recognise this aspect of the design as the fulfilment of a specific educational requirement. The structure would permit the public to witness 'a crude picture of that social level from which emerged our earliest human ancestors' but, since 'we have little or nothing to gain from watching the behaviour of animals' in seeking 'a solution to our own social and political problems', this engagement with the ape could only be presented as catharsis:
54 a recognition of our functional affinities with the animal-machine in order to induce a yet more rigorous repression of that shared past, a repression that would reinforce, since in Zuckerman's philosophy it originally constituted, the essence of our human identity. '[It is] idle to suppose that because man is a primate, and sub-human primates lead their lives blindly according to scales of dominance and submission, human beings must therefore resign themselves to an eternity of conflict over material things', he insisted, on reviewing his horrific survey of sub-human social behaviour. 'The price of our continued existence may well be further repressions of dominant impulses, and further developments of the operative behaviour whose beginnings can be vaguely seen in our transition from a simian to a human level of existence.' The estrangement that 'pulp' elements in the design of the Gorilla House effected therefore served an important purpose. Like much of the cinema of the period, Lubetkin's theatre offered scope for a popular ritual of regression: the primitive drives that threatened civilised society were not permitted to fester in darkness, but were rendered safe by being brought to light. Lubetkin's Gorilla House rigorously asserted throughout the viewing experience the traditional Cartesian gulf between the human subject and the animal object, preventing that process of 'anthropomorphising' that Solly Zuckerman feared and wished to guard against.
In Bertold Lubetkin the London Zoological Society had found exactly the right architect to respond to Zuckerman's concerns over how the lives of the great apes might be interpreted by an uninformed public. As architectural historian John Allan has observed, the theatrical approach is 'readily traced back to Lubetkin's philosophic commitment to the rationalist ideal '. 56 Allan notes that the architect chose to place a Corinthian capital (unearthed in the course of excavation, part of John Nash's development of this district during the Regency) next to the entrance like a talisman, or an embryonic caryatid. 'For Lubetkin, even a gorilla house was not merely a machine for gorillas to live in: it was a declaration of human values.' 57 The architect's own daughter describes this commitment rather more bluntly: 'He believed that human reason was an irresistible force; that science would unlock every secret, cure every ill, and that human beings, by virtue of their rationality, were superior to all other forms of life.' Her father is said to have clung to these credenda 'fiercely and proclaimed them with a passion which was anything but rational '. 58 In her account of a childhood on the Gloucestershire farm that Lubetkin took over after retiring from the capital, Louise Kehoe relates how these beliefs propelled the builder of zoos into pioneering new industrial methods of farming, including one contraption that he called a 'cattle crush' -which apparently did just what the name implied. 'Factory farming had not then been invented, but he discovered it for himself, turning his architectural skills to the task of designing slat-floored prisons in which pigs and cows could be immobilized and forcibly, repeatedly mated to ensure the best yield of offspring with the least fallow time.'
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Kehoe is quick to add that Lubetkin was not unsympathetic to his animals; he could be kind and took great pleasure in watching their antics. But his philosophy bound him to the idea that the animal is a 56 Allan, Berthold Lubetkin, p. 201. 57 Ibid., p. 208. 58 Louise Kehoe, In This Dark House (New York 1995) pp. 40 -1. 59 Ibid., p. 42. machine, while only the human can be said to have mind. His zoo buildings aggressively insist upon this fact in an era when this tenet central to the Cartesian tradition seemed to have been threatened by Darwinism and the discovery of the anthropoid. As Kehoe observes, 'by juxtaposing the cool, mathematical precision of pure geometric shapes -cylinders, spirals, ellipses, cast in thin sections of white reinforced concrete -with the lumbering gait and awkward, unrefined behaviour of the captive tenants, he made clowns and performers of them in spite of themselves'.
60
The animal is held in patterns from Euclidean geometry, mapped on a Cartesian grid, that testify to the all-encompassing power of the rational mind. 'The animals became living monuments to rationalism, imprisoned not so much by bars or cages, but by their intellectual inferiority to humankind, whose will had wrought the seamless, soaring concrete canopies that sheltered them.'
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In many of the zoo buildings this tendency is not nearly as pronounced as Kehoe suggests, and Lubetkin has been justly hailed for developing a new form of civic architecture that permitted unprecedented interactions between man and beast. But as Louis MacNeice recognised on viewing the structure shortly after its completion, there was something excessive in the Gorilla House's formal emphasis on circulation and control.
Beyond the Elephant House is one of the very newest and grandest of the Zoo buildings, the circular gorilla House of white concrete . . . by Messers. Tecton. This is all gadgets, central heating, coddling and slickness, and, like all this firm's designs, is, aesthetically, a trifle frigid. We must, of course, always plump for the animal's health and comfort rather than for our own, probably sentimental, certainly irrelevant, delight in a more homely and cowshed atmosphere, but all the same we may remember that Alfred, the Bristol gorilla . . . has lived in perfect health for years in much more primitive quarters without any of this air-conditioning or up-to-the-minute setting. And we may remember that Americans, with all their science-in-the-home and centrally heated houses, beat the world when it comes to catching colds.
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Ostensibly there to protect the gorillas from airborne infection and a northern climate to which they were not adapted, the obtrusive nature of the systems for air-conditioning, running water, sliding dust-screen, 60 Ibid., p. 41. 61 Ibid. 62 Louis MacNeice, Zoo (London 1938) p. 50. revolving sun room, are said to represent an unwarranted thoroughness of treatment. In point of fact, these elements seem to have been lifted from the design for a tuberculosis clinic that was never built.
63 When the care taken over the formal integration of measures for the flow of human traffic through the building is also taken into account it becomes evident these systems were not in place merely for the sake of the gorillas, but were part of a wider preoccupation on the part of the architect with the aesthetics of circulation and control. 'In the new house the audience is encouraged to keep moving: porches, entrances and public spaces are designed to give directions to the visitor and to propel him forward', runs a contemporary report in the journal for Architectural Designs and Construction of June 1933. 'The old game of discovering family likenesses at the Zoo is, therefore, discouraged.' 64 This attention to the structure's formal emphasis upon movement is also evident in the film on the modernist architecture at London and Whipsnade by Lazlo Maholy-Nagy, referred to earlier in this article, in which a series of simple animations highlights the kinetic properties of the Gorilla House and Penguin Pool. Significantly, the treatment of the two gorillas in this motion picture differs considerably from that accorded the other zoo animals: while giraffes and penguins are captured rushing through their new enclosures, in shots that convey an exhilarating sensation of freedom and speed, the gorillas alone do not move, but cling and stare as the building itself moves about them. The freedom of movement celebrated in this section of the film is not proper to the gorillas, but a property of the machine they inhabit; while the other structures suggest movement, only the Gorilla House is a moving object; while the rest seem to inspire a delight in movement on the part of the animals, the Gorilla House reduces the apes it contains to passive spectators. The architect's preoccupation with a systematic regulation of circulation is a striking manifestation of a concept that has been a characteristic element in European thought since the Enlightenment: the metaphor of circulation. As David Trotter has shown in his book on this subject, over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this concept, initially derived from medicine, became an all-encompassing metaphor that politicians, economists, urban planners, philosophers and philanthropists applied to an extraordinary range of different problems, enabling them to formulate and install those systems that our technological, densely populated, and urbanised civilisation now depends upon. 65 is as simple as can be', remarks Wolfgang Schivelbusch: 'whatever was part of circulation was regarded as healthy, progressive, constructive; all that was detached from circulation, on the other hand, appeared diseased, medieval, subversive, threatening.' 66 It should come as no surprise that we should find Zuckerman struggling for this word in the 1930s when he came to define the essence of culture, that which sets us apart from the rest of the animal world: 'By virtue of the tools we construct, we organize our lives to a large extent according to means of production and exchange', he claimed. 67 And Zuckerman expressed this idea more stridently in later years, having talked with Lévi-Strauss: 'I believe Lévi-Strauss to be right when he makes the point that "humanization" implies a synthesis of a number of cultural elements (among which exchange is critical) which, as it were, became combined in a flash.'
68 No less than the Corinthian capital set up at the entrance, Lubetkin's formal emphasis on circulation is an emphatic expression, not merely of Western civilisation, but of 'human' values, as formulated in the Enlightenment. The animal that might have successfully aped our human capacity to respond is held immobile in the midst of systems for the circulation of light, water, air, heat, and the crowd, powerless within a cultural paradigm that had become the entelechy of that Logos proper to man. No longer free to say 'I am', but bound within a fearsome structure of thought, the inmates are given space to play only at being what we think of as gorilla: in this instance, as has been suggested, the embodiment of a peculiarly human quality, a culturally specific notion of the bestiality of the Id. Mok and Moina were in one sense dead at the moment of arrival; they could only ever have been experienced as human artefacts, in the House of Light.
The formal procedures employed in the Tecton Gorilla House may reflect a more general tendency in that phase of theory and practice to which the term modernist is applied, though to demonstrate this effectively would require more space than is here available. But I should like to suggest that the subsequent application of Lubetkin's Cartesian architecture to the human environment ultimately constituted a form of subtle violence inflicted upon the concept of the Human Being -by that concept and in the name of that concept -in the act of naming that 66 conceptf?g. In a final twist, the working-class visitors who flocked to see the gorillas in the House of Light had encountered a foreshadowing of their own alienation. As John Berger pointed out in 1977, in the post-war era people would perceive in captive animals (in spite of Zuckerman's efforts) a template that might 'help us to understand, accept and overcome the stresses involved in living in consumer societies'.
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Though much post-war modernist mass-housing was lovingly designed such spaces are undeniably totalitarian environments. Everything is worked out, for either good or ill, by the architect. Like the animals in London Zoo, the inhabitants occupy a space that leaves nothing open to chance or change, but which has been built specifically in order to foster what the architect perceived to be the essential characteristic of human being: a capacity for rational thought. In at last realising on that basis the complete separation of our species from every other animal on the planet, many inhabitants of the post-war New Reality soon found themselves physically trapped in a habit of thought, one that has often produced remarkable results, but which is still very much a habit, merely one way of thinking, crippling our personal capacity for re-creation. An architect might create spaces for play in the most successful complexes, as in Le Corbusier's Unité d'Habitation in Marseilles, but even a playful totalitarian space leaves no space for that re-creation, the reinvention of the self, that is the be all and end all of recreation. In such total environments residents are deprived of a capacity which has been thought of as proper to humankind -but which can be shown to belong in some measure to every living thing. As Charles Darwin pointed out, birds, for instance, in choosing a mate, will select that bird with the plumage they find most appealing; over time such choices will transform the secondary sexual characteristics of any given species. 70 This observation is vertiginous because in a mere paragraph Darwin has shown how other species can be said to respond to modify and enrich their world.
In short, the modernist urban planning initiated in the United Kingdom by Lubetkin's Gorilla House propelled us into a new phase in our thinking regarding 'the Animal'. We had imposed on our own species that passivity which has throughout recorded history been entailed upon 'the Animal', and had done so in the very act of rendering that difference absolute. In moving beyond that shared tragedy, the recognition of this capacity for self-creation is providing the basis for the participatory practices currently being introduced in both zoos and the human environment. Far from eliminating the differences between humans and animals (as in well-intentioned, but flawed, attempts to extend human rights to other species) this postmodernist approach provides scope for the multiplication of 'difference': 'the frontier no longer forms a single indivisible line but more one internally divided line . . . the edges of a limit that grows and multiplies by feeding on an abyss' (Derrida, 2008, p. 31) .
